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This paper investigates how accountability pressures under No Child Left Behind (NCLB) may affect
children’s rate of overweight. Schools facing increased pressures to produce academic outcomes may
reallocate their efforts in ways that have unintended consequences for children’s health. For example,
schools may cut back on recess and physical education in favor of increasing time on tested subjects.
To examine the impact of school accountability programs, we create a unique panel data set of schools
in Arkansas that allows us to test the impact of NCLB rules on students’ weight outcomes. Our main
approach is to consider schools to be facing increased pressures if they are on the margin of passing
– that is, if any subgroup at the school has a passing rate that is close to the AYP passing threshold,
where we define close as being 5 percentage points above or below the threshold. We find evidence
of small effects of accountability pressures on the percent of students at a school that are overweight.
A follow-up survey of school principals points to reductions in physical activity and worsening of
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  Childhood obesity has increased dramatically over the past three decades, from about 
4 percent during the mid-1970s to 16 percent today. There have been many changes in 
children’s lives during the period when children’s obesity has been increasing (see Anderson 
and Butcher 2006a). In particular, there have been changes at home and at school that may 
contribute to increased obesity. Understanding how the school environment may contribute 
to obesity is critical as the school environment may be relatively more within the control of 
public policy makers than the family environment. In recent years, especially, pressures on 
schools have changed dramatically. No Child Left Behind (NCLB) added explicit 
“accountability” incentives for schools to improve test score outcomes without necessarily 
providing more resources with which to produce these outcomes.  
  This paper investigates how accountability pressures under NCLB may affect children’s 
obesity. Children’s health is not among the outcomes for which schools are held accountable 
– standardized test achievement is the primary area monitored, with secondary emphasis on 
attendance and graduation rates. Schools facing increased pressure to produce academic 
outcomes may reallocate their efforts in ways that have unintended consequences for 
children’s health. The new financial pressures due to accountability rules may, for example, 
induce school administrators to try to raise new funds through outside food and beverage 
contracts, or time pressures may cause them to cut back on recess and physical education in 
favor of increased time teaching tested subjects.1  
  To examine the impact of school accountability programs, we create a unique data set 
that allows us to test the impact of NCLB rules on students’ weight outcomes. This dataset 
combines school-level rates of “obesity” and “overweight” for school children in Arkansas 
                                            
1 Additionally, schools may use food as rewards to motivate students, and there is the possibility that testing 
pressures increase cortisol secretions in children due to the increased stress, which may lead to weight gain.   2
with data from the Arkansas Department of Education on standardized test proficiency rates 
in English and math for all schools, by grade and subgroup.2 The standardized test pass rates 
are those used for determining whether a school is making Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) 
under NCLB.  The main methodological difficulty in trying to assess the causal effect of 
accountability pressures on children’s health outcomes is that schools that have children who 
perform poorly on tests may also have children who have worse health outcomes.  Our 
empirical strategy, described in detail below, addresses this issue by taking advantage of the 
fact that the determination of which schools do and do not make Adequate Yearly Progress is 
very complicated, and even schools with generally high performing students (who are likely to 
be healthier) face accountability pressures that may induce changes at the school that 
adversely affect students’ health status.   
  The main empirical results examine whether schools facing accountability pressure 
have more overweight and obese students.  These results, however, cannot examine the 
mechanisms through which changes that are made to be NCLB compliant may affect 
children’s obesity.  In order to directly examine those mechanisms, we designed and fielded a 
survey of school principals in Arkansas.   An analysis of Arkansas principals’ reports of 
changes they have made at their schools in response to No Child Left Behind supports the 
notion that these changes could plausibly affect children’s caloric intake or expenditure.    
  Below, we describe the Arkansas data and accountability program in more detail, and 
discuss our approach to modeling the role that accountability pressures may play. We then 
present results from empirical models on obesity rates, as well as some results of a survey of 
school principals, before concluding. 
                                            
2 Obesity is defined as having a body mass index (BMI) greater than the 95th percentile of a distribution of age- 
and sex-specific BMIs from a baseline population from the 1970s. Overweight is defined analogously, with BMI 
greater than the 85th percentile. The official Arkansas documentation follows CDC convention and labels these 
thresholds differently as “overweight” and “at risk of overweight,” respectively. We will use the more common 
terms “obese” and “overweight” instead.   3
 
II. Policy and Research Background 
  In 2002, the Federal No Child Left Behind (NCLB) legislation was passed, requiring 
states to define and implement stringent accountability standards and prescribing increasing 
penalties for schools that fail to meet their state’s standard. Under NCLB in Arkansas, schools 
are held accountable for the fraction of children in a school who earn a passing score on the 
state standardized tests in math and literacy.3 For an elementary school to be deemed 
passing4, approximately 30 percent of students in the school had to pass the test in 2002. The 
percent passing goal ratchets up by about 7 percentage points each year until it reaches 100 
percent in 2014. The starting points are slightly lower for higher grades, and the annual 
increase in the goals are slightly higher in order to reach the Federally mandated goal of 100 
percent proficiency by 2014.5 In addition to the overall percentage passing in the school, each 
student subgroup – as defined by race, socio-economic status and other educational 
categories – must meet the same percent passing rate. A school that fails to meet the passing 
percentage in a certain year can still be awarded passing status through the “safe harbor 
provision” if the fraction of students failing in the school declines by 10 percent or more 
between one year and the next. This is a simplified overview of the program. There are more 
details that are important for the data work but add little to the intuition of the program – 
such as minimum subgroup size rules and the ability of schools to use a 3-year average 
percent passing instead of their current pass rate – that are described in more detail in 
Appendix A. 
                                            
3 The passing threshold on the Arkansas state test is lower than the threshold on the Nation’s Report Card 
(NAEP) test. In particular, 62 (61) percent of students passed the 4th grade state test in literacy (math), while 28 
(26) percent of 4th graders passed the NAEP test. This 34-35 percentage point difference across tests in pass 
rates is in line with the U.S. average of 32-37 points (Education Week, 2006). The information about Arkansas’s 
NCLB program is taken from http://arkansased.org/nclb/nclb.html (accessed March 25, 2010). 
4 We refer to schools as “failing” schools or “passing” schools.  However, the official nomenclature is that schools 
that we refer to as “failing” schools are in “School Improvement Status.” 
5 Annual AYP percent passing goals by grade and subject are listed in Appendix Table 1.   4
  If a school fails to meet the AYP goals for 2 consecutive years, they must implement 
corrective actions that increase in severity over time if the school continues to fail from 
allowing students to transfer to a different non-failing school in the district in year 1, to being 
required to offer supplemental instruction to students in year 2, to more extreme measures 
such as school restructuring in year 5. In the first few years of NCLB, approximately 25 
percent of Arkansas schools were out of compliance with AYP (Blankenship and Barnett, 
2006), while 46 percent were failing in 2009 (Arkansas Department of Education, 2009). 
  A substantial amount of research has documented that schools respond to 
accountability pressures. Overall, test scores improve – sometimes quite substantially – after 
accountability is enacted (Carnoy and Loeb 2002, Jacob 2005, Figlio and Rouse 2006, Dee 
and Jacob 2009, Wong et al. 2010). These gains are made in part by schools’ strategic 
responses that alter whom they teach and test – for example strategically assigning kids to 
special education or English Language Learner status (Cullen and Reback 2006), strategically 
suspending low performing students (Figlio 2006) or shifting teaching resources toward 
students on the cusp of passing (Reback 2008, Neal and Schanzenbach 2009). Bokhari and 
Schneider (2009) find that stricter accountability laws result in more children being 
prescribed psychostimulates for ADHD (and being diagnosed with the disorder). Schools also 
strategically alter what they teach, shifting effort toward literacy and math and away from un-
tested subjects (Jacob 2005, Rouse et al. 2007). 
  It is intuitive that accountability rules surrounding standardized test performance may 
affect test scores.  In order for accountability pressures to affect children’s obesity, it must 
affect either calories expended or ingested, and there is less prior research that directly 
addresses this question.  The small number of papers that address these issues, however, 
point to changes in the food or physical activity environment that could affect children’s 
calorie balance.  For example, Figlio and Winicki (2005) find that schools that face   5
accountability sanctions increase the number of calories offered in their school lunches 
during the testing period. Anderson and Butcher (2006b) find that schools in states with 
accountability measures are more likely to give students access to junk food.6 Additionally, 
they find that schools that are more likely to give students access to junk have students with 
higher BMI.  
  As for school changes that affect the calorie expenditure side of the equation, the 
Center on Education Policy (2007) finds 20 percent of school districts have decreased recess 
time since NCLB was enacted, with an average decrease of 50 minutes per week. Yin (2009) 
uses cross-state differences in the implementation of accountability laws (pre-NCLB) to 
explore the effects of accountability on obesity and  finds that high school students in states 
with accountability laws show a significant increase in body mass index and obesity rates.  
Her analysis also includes an examination of the potential mechanisms by assessing how 
physical education participation varies with the introduction of accountability laws. She finds 
evidence that female adolescents’ participation in PE classes declines with the advent of 
accountability.  It is worth noting, however, that there is not much compelling evidence that 
increased PE time decreases obesity rates among high school students. Using state changes in 
state PE requirements, Cawley et al. (2007) find that while increased time in PE may increase 
the reported level of physical activity among high school students, there is no evidence that it 
reduces students’ body weight or likelihood of being overweight or obese.7  Note that our 
empirical analysis includes elementary school students as well as high school students, thus 
the mechanisms for changes in physical activity also include changes in recess time.  
                                            
6 This paper uses a two sample two-stage least squares estimation strategy, and whether or not the school is in a state that 
has an accountability rule is one of the factors used in the first stage which predicts the fraction of schools in a county that 
give students access to junk food.  
7 It is surprisingly difficult to find research using credible sources of exogenous variation in physical activity that shows a 
large and statistically significant link to obesity.  Not only is it difficult to find credible sources of exogenous variation in 
reported time in physical activity, it is usually impossible to measure effort or intensity of that physical activity. And, as 
anyone who has tried to track their own calories consumed and expended knows, it is distressingly easy to offset calories 
burned in physical activity with changes in consumption.    6
  
  Beyond our school-level exploration of the effect of accountability on obesity rates, we 
provide more insight into the possible mechanisms with a survey of Arkansas school 
principals, described below. 
 
III. Background and Data 
In order to measure the impact of NCLB pressure on children’s obesity status, we 
construct a unique dataset that merges school-level information on test scores, obesity, and 
other demographic characteristics from different sources.  Using these different sources, we 
construct our final data set which has 2852 observations for Arkansas schools from 2004 to 
2007.  The data contain information on 1190 different schools in Arkansas; 447 of  the schools 
include grades 7 and above, the rest include only lower grades.   
 
A. Arkansas Assessment of Childhood and Adolescent Obesity8 
  In 2003 the state of Arkansas passed a sweeping act intended to help combat 
childhood and adolescent obesity. Although obesity has been increasing nationwide, obesity 
levels were particularly high in Arkansas. In 2003, about 21 percent of school aged children in 
Arkansas were obese or overweight, while this figure was about 18 percent for the nation as a 
whole.9 A multifaceted coalition came together to address the challenge of childhood obesity, 
and passed Act 1220 of the 2003 Arkansas General Assembly.10 A central component of this 
initiative was the reporting of health risk information to parents (ACHI 2004).  
                                            
8 This section draws heavily from the yearly reports on the Arkansas Assessment of Childhood and Adolescent 
Obesity released by the Arkansas Center for Health Improvement. Reports are available online at: www.achi.net 
9 Comparison of Table 1 in ACHI (2004) to NHANES 2003-2004 calculations 
(http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/dnpa/obesity/childhood/prevalence.htm).  
10 The coalition included parents, school nurses, teachers, and administrators, private foundations (including 
Robert Wood Johnson), physicians, hospitals, universities, Governor Mike Huckabee, the Arkansas 
Departments of Education and Health, among many others.   7
  The Arkansas Center for Health Improvement (ACHI) spearheaded the effort to collect 
height and weight information for each school child in the state of Arkansas. This effort 
included ensuring that each school had the equipment and trained personnel necessary to 
accurately weigh and measure each child.11 After children were weighed and measured, a 
letter then went home to each parent describing the child’s BMI, where this fit in the BMI 
distribution (whether the child was obese, overweight, healthy weight, or underweight), and 
the type of health risks that might be associated with the child’s BMI. Parents of children with 
an unhealthy weight were urged to consult a physician. An implicit assumption of this effort 
was that if better information was in the hands of parents, they could make – or help their 
children make – better informed, more healthful, choices that would improve their weight 
outcomes. Additionally, an annual public report is produced (available on the ACHI website) 
with the percent of students who are underweight, normal weight, overweight, and obese at 
each public school in Arkansas. Thus, due to the Arkansas Assessment of Childhood and 
Adolescent Obesity, we have panel data on school-level rates of overweight and obesity from 
2004 to 2007.  
 
B. School Academic Performance Reports  
  One of the requirements of NCLB is to make available school-level information on the 
passing rate, both overall and for student subgroups. School report cards for Arkansas were 
provided by the Department of Education. These school report cards provide information on 
the percent of students scored as proficient on the literacy test and the percent scored as 
proficient on the math test.  As described above, a school’s AYP designation is determined by 
the average passing rate of its students overall. In addition, the passing rate of all designated 
                                            
11 Training included taking each measure a number of times to ensure accuracy.    8
sub-groups that have a large enough enrollment in the school must also meet the goal.12 
Student sub-groups are defined by race (for whites, African Americans, Hispanics, etc.), and 
as low socio-economic status, English language learners, and students with disabilities. If any 
one of the student subgroups fails to attain AYP, then the entire school is designated as failing 
to meet AYP.13 
  While these basic rules are straightforward enough, in practice a school can be deemed 
to meet or fail to meet AYP for several other reasons. For example, even if a school (or 
subgroup) has a lower fraction of students meeting AYP than the passing standard requires, it 
still might make AYP through the “Safe Harbor” provision, which allows a school to be 
deemed as passing if the percentage of failing students (within subject and subgroup) declines 
by ten percent relative to the prior year. On the other hand, a school will be deemed as failing 
despite its passing rate if too low a fraction of its students participate in the test, or if 
attendance or graduation rates are below the target threshold.14   
  There are many details involved in determining AYP status and this means it is very 
difficult using publicly available data to predict which schools will be deemed as making AYP 
and which schools will be placed on “School Improvement Status”.15 Since only aggregate data 
on grade level by subject by subgroup are available to us, we cannot perfectly predict AYP 
status.   However, it seems very likely that if it is difficult for researchers to determine which 
schools will make AYP and which will not, it is likely also difficult for school administrators to 
make such a determination as the school year progresses.  If school administrators change the 
way resources are deployed at the school in order to help insure that the school makes AYP 
                                            
12 The definition of “large enough” varies by state. In Arkansas, there must be 40 students in the subgroup for it 
to count toward accountability, or if there are more than 800 students in the school the subgroup must be at 
least 5 percent of the total enrollment. 
13 Again, although we refer to these as “failing” schools, the official nomenclature is that these schools are in 
“School Improvement Status.” 
14 More information on the Arkansas accountability plan is available at 
http://arkansased.org/nclb/pdf/accountability_wkbk_021208b.pdf.   
15 It is, in fact, impossible to do this with school level data on aggregate student performance.  The official determination is 
made using micro level data on student performance and detailed information on student characteristics.   9
status, these changes are unlikely to be starkly discontinuous around the threshold of making 
and not making AYP.   Administrators may have a sense of whether they are likely to be far 
below or far above the requirements for making AYP, but there is likely to be a substantial 
fraction of schools where the administrators believe they are on the margin of making or 
failing to make Adequate Yearly Progress.  It is these schools where administrators should 
have the most incentive to make changes to improve test scores.   The data we have access to, 
percent proficient by grade-level by subject by subgroup,  will allow us to identify schools 
where administrators are likely to be worried about marginally making or missing AYP.  
 
C. Other Demographic Characteristics 
  Subgroup proficiency rates are reported on the school report cards for groups with a 
sample size of at least 10, but only subgroups that have sample size of 40 (or 5 percent of total 
enrollment, whichever is larger) count toward the official accountability rating. As a result, we 
need to obtain measures of subgroup sample sizes. Although perfect data on this are not 
publicly available, we are able to estimate population sizes from the Common Core of Data 
(CCD) for the years 2002-2006.16 The CCD data report annual school-by-grade enrollment 
overall and for several subgroups of interest (whites, African Americans and Hispanics). In 
addition, we were able to proxy for the number of low-income students in each grade by 
multiplying the school-level fraction of students on free or reduced-priced lunch by the grade-
specific enrollment. We used the information on enrollment from the CCD to omit test scores 
from accountability calculations if they were based on too small of a population and therefore 
did not count toward accountability status under Arkansas rules. We also use the CCD data to 
                                            
16 Because the BMI and test score data extend to 2007 but at the time we began our project the CCD data were 
not yet available for that year, we assign 2007 CCD data to be the same as the 2006 data.   10
create school-level demographics on percent nonwhite and percent poor (i.e. receiving free or 
reduced-price lunch). 
    
IV. Methodology 
  The main challenge in isolating the effect of NCLB on children’s weight outcomes is 
that low-income children are more likely to score poorly on standardized tests, and are also 
more likely to be overweight. As a result, a simple cross-sectional relationship between NCLB 
status and children’s weight will be a biased estimate of the impact of accountability pressure 
on obesity. We take two basic approaches to investigating the possibility that accountability 
pressures may be contributing to childhood overweight. The first approach assumes that 
accountability-induced behavioral changes are likely to be greatest among schools that are 
close to meeting their targets. That is, schools easily meeting the current proficiency levels are 
unlikely to feel the need to change their behaviors much in the face of accountability, while 
schools very far from meeting the standards may feel pressure, but will be less likely to think 
that a small change such as a reduction in recess time or using a portion of the time allocated 
for gym class to work on mathematics concepts will be useful in addressing their deficiencies. 
However, we expect that schools with test scores just above and just below the target in year 
t-1 are the most likely to make the types of changes that could result in more overweight and 
obese students by year t. By comparing these “marginal” schools to those far away from the 
thresholds, we can determine if accountability is having an unintended impact on children’s 
health. Our second approach assumes that if a school has seen larger proficiency gains over a 
year, then that school probably undertook some types of behavioral changes to achieve those 
gains. As a result, we compare schools that make large gains in a given year to schools that 
make more modest gains, and measure whether there is a significant difference in obesity 
rates or changes in obesity rates between them.   11
  With our first empirical approach we address the main methodological challenge by 
taking advantage of the fact a school being categorized as “marginal” in our framework is not 
straightforwardly related to the socio-economic status of students in that school.  Under 
NCLB rules, the entire school fails to make AYP if any single subgroup fails to meet the 
proficiency goal; as a result the school’s status is defined by its worst-performing subgroup.17 
For each school-grade-year, for each test, for each subgroup with a group size large enough to 
count toward the official accountability rating, we standardize the proficiency rates around 
that year’s AYP threshold. For example, for the 4th grade math test, the initial threshold is 40 
percent. If a subgroup had a 45 percent proficiency rate, their standardized rate for 4th grade 
math in the initial year is 5. Similarly if a subgroup had a proficiency rate of 30, their 
standardized rate for 4th grade math in the initial year is -10. Thus, positive standardized rates 
represent meeting AYP, while negative ones represent failure to meet AYP. Since AYP is 
determined at the school level, not grade level, we then aggregate the data to the school-year 
level. We define school-level proficiency score as the minimum standardized rate across all 
grades and subgroups in the school. We also maintain the minimum-across-grades math and 
literacy proficiency rates for the overall school population, as they reflect more generally on 
the school’s overall academic performance. Additionally, based on the CCD, we calculate the 
percentage of the school’s students who are nonwhite, and the percent poor to control for 
observable demographics. 
  Our first approach, then, is to consider schools to be “marginal” if they have a 
minimum subgroup passing rate that is close to the AYP threshold, and to hold constant other 
factors that are related to student socio-economic status, test scores, and health outcomes. 
We define “close to the AYP threshold” as being 5 percentage points above or below the 
                                            
17 However, as seen below, we investigate the robustness of our results to this choice.   12
threshold.18 While schools may have some idea that they are going to be close to making or 
missing the AYP threshold and change behaviors contemporaneously, we will nonetheless 
estimate current rates of overweight or obesity based on the previous year’s test results to 
ensure that the school has had time to react to being close to the AYP threshold. We estimate 
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where Overwgt is the percentage of students in school s at time t who are overweight or 
obese, mathprof and litprof are the overall current-year proficiency rate in math and literacy, 
respectively, pctnw is the fraction of the student enrollment that is non-white, and pctpoor is 
the fraction of student enrollment on free or reduced-price lunch. The variable marginal is an 
indicator for whether the worst-performing subgroup last year was within 5 points of the 
passing threshold, and proxies for whether the school might implement short-term policies 
that might harm student obesity rates, such as curtailing recess. A nice feature of this 
approach is that we can flexibly control for the overall achievement in a school and identify 
schools at risk of missing AYP based on their worst-performing subgroup. For example, two 
schools with similar overall achievement rates may be very similar, but one school is at risk 
under AYP because of a struggling subgroup, while the other school does not face that risk 
because they have too few students to have that subgroup count toward the school’s 
accountability status.19 In some specifications we augment the specification with the lagged 
dependent variable – that is, the prior year’s rate of overweight.  Additionally, we can 
compare the “marginal” schools separately to schools that are farther above and below the 
threshold. To do this,  we add a separate control for whether the minimum subgroup in a 
                                            
18 We have also experimented with alternative divisions with qualitatively similar results. 
19 One might be interested in measuring whether there is a particularly strong impact on the rate of overweight 
of students in the actual subgroups that were marginal. Unfortunately, we do not have access to sufficiently 
disaggregated data to do such an estimate.   13
school always scores more than 5 points above the cutoff; in these specifications, the 
coefficient on “marginal” and the coefficient on “>5 points above” are both relative to the 
schools for which the worst performing subgroup is more than 5 points below the threshold.   
This allows us to compare schools in the marginal group separately to schools in each “tail” of 
performance (for the worst performing subgroup).  To further probe these relationships, we 
also estimate these equations based on whether any subgroup (and not just the minimum 
subgroup) is on the margin of passing in the prior year, and whether any subgroup has ever 
been on the margin of passing. 
  Our second approach focuses on the relationship between overall school performance 
and obesity rates, not subgroup performance. The school’s change in math proficiency rate is 
added to the school’s change in literacy proficiency rate to define the total proficiency gain 
over the prior year.   Gains in proficiency scores might occur for for several reasons, 
including: 1)mean reversion, if the prior years scores were aberrantly low; 2) changes in the 
type of student who took the test; or 3) changes in the way the school allocates its resources 
that are intended to improve test scores.   The idea with this specification is that if schools 
that managed test score gains did it by changing the way it resources are allocated, then those 
changes may have the potential to affect children’s weight as well as test performance.  As 
with the models focusing on the marginal schools, the main threat to validity in this approach 
is that factors that are correlated with test performance, like the composition of the student 
body, may also be correlated with obesity rates.   In these specifications, we also control 
flexibly for current demographics and academic performance.  Additionally, it is important to 
keep in mind that any mechanical change in the student body that would tend to improve test 
scores would also be expected to reduce obesity rates, since higher socio-economic status 
students, on average, have higher test scores and lower BMI.  Thus, any unmeasured socio-  14
economic characteristics in these regressions would be likely to bias the coefficient toward 
finding a negative relationship between gains in test performance and obesity rates.   
 
V. Results 
A. The Role of NCLB on Students’ Overweight Status 
  We start by examining some basic descriptive statistics using the final data set. 
Looking at the top rows of Table 1, in the first column we see that almost a fifth of school-by-
year cells in Arkansas are classified as being “marginal” (i.e. the school’s minimum scoring 
grade-test-subgroup cell falls within 5 points of the AYP threshold), with the remaining 
school-by-year cells being almost evenly split between being more clearly in failing territory 
(scoring more than 5 points below the AYP threshold) and passing territory (scoring more 
than 5 points above the AYP threshold). Moving down the column, we see that overall in the 
average school-by-year observation 38.3 percent of students are overweight or obese, 
53.6 percent receive free or reduced-price lunch and 26.9 percent are nonwhite. Finally, on 
average schools  met the target English proficiency rate by 13.5 percentage points and the 
target math proficiency rate by 12.6 points, but over the previous year the total proficiency 
rate actually dropped by almost one percentage point because the target passing rate 
increased in line with the schedule presented in Appendix Table 1. The second and third 
columns present characteristics for the average school which is marginal in terms of meeting 
the AYP goal and the average school which is not. Keeping in mind that “non-marginal” 
schools are comprised of schools with minimum scoring groups that are both farther below 
and above the threshold for AYP,  one sees that there is a very slightly higher rate of 
overweight and obesity at the marginal schools, and that this does not appear to be driven 
primarily by demographic differences.  Marginal schools have a very slightly lower rate of free 
and reduced-price lunch recipients and a much lower nonwhite percentage. In terms of   15
overall school performance, both marginal and non-marginal schools are fairly similar, with 
the overall test performance of marginal schools actually being a bit better in both English 
and Math. Note however, the marginal schools had higher proficiency rate growth over the 
past year, up almost 3 percentage points, while non-marginal schools lost almost 
2 percentage points. 
  Table 2 presents the results of the basic model described in equation (1) above, with 
schools categorized as “marginal” by their lowest-performing subgroup and percent 
overweight (including obese) as the dependent variable. Standard errors are clustered by 
school. Starting with column (1), we see that marginal schools in Arkansas have a rate of 
overweight that is just under 1 percentage point higher than the non-marginal schools. When 
we augment the controls with the lagged value of overweight in column (2), schools that were 
marginal in the previous year see an increase in the rate of overweight that is almost 
0.5 percentage points larger than those that were non-marginal.20 Columns (3) and (4) 
continue to control for the lagged rate over overweight, and compare the marginal group of 
schools separately against the top and bottom of the distribution.21  Marginal schools have 
0.59 percentage points more overweight students compared to schools where the worst 
performing subgroup is more than 5 points above the AYP threshold, and this difference is 
statistically signifcant at conventional levels.  Note, however, that the point estimate in 
column (4) is also positive and indicates that marginal schools have 0.361 percentage points 
more overweight students than schools where the worst performing subgroup is more than 
5 points below the AYP threshold.  While this coefficient is not statistically different from 
zero, it also is not statistically different from the coefficient estimated in column (3).  If being 
                                            
20 If we simply replace the flexible function of overall test performance with the lagged value of overweight, the 
results are very similar to those presented (e.g. the coefficient (standard error) for column (2) is 0.519 (0.200)), 
but since the test score variables are jointly significant, we retain them in the model presented. 
21 We recognize that column (4) can be derived from column (3), but estimate both models for ease of 
determining statistical significance.   16
a “marginal” school were straightforwardly correlated with socio-economic status, then we 
would expect that marginal schools would have children with worse health outcomes than 
schools in the “more than 5 points above AYP” group and better health outcomes than schools 
in the “more than 5 points below AYP.”  Instead, schools in the “marginal” category have 
students with worse health outcomes than schools where the worst performing subgroup is 
farther away from the threshold, either above or below.  This strongly suggests that 
“marginal”schools are undertaking actions to try to make adequate yearly progress, and that 
these actions may have unintended consequences.    
  Our alternate approach is based on the gains in proficiency levels across years. Schools 
with larger year-to-year gains have likely done something to improve scores, and in doing so 
may have adopted policies that result in increased overweight. The specification in columns 
(5) and (6) uses the sum of the math and reading proficiency gains experienced by the school 
overall (not any particular subgroup).  In column (5), we see a significantly positive estimate 
indicating that a school making a bigger proficiency gain under NCLB over the past year has a 
slightly higher rate of overweight. Because Arkansas set up its schedule for AYP to involve 
equal increments each year until reaching 100 percent proficiency, a typical school that just 
met its goal in one year would be expected to add about another 7 or 8 percentage points to 
each of the literacy and math proficiency rates (for a total gain of about 15) in order to make 
AYP again the next year. Based on the results in column (5), a school making this size gain 
would be expected to have a rate of overweight that is about 0.43 percentage points higher 
than a school not making any gains, which is similar to the effect for marginal schools found 
in column (2). However, when we control for last year’s rate of overweight in column (6), the 
estimated effect of the total gain becomes very small and insignificant. Note, however, that if 
a school is regularly making large gains, changes resulting in weight gain may have been put 
in place in the past, with no additional changes in policies or weight occurring in the current   17
year.  Controlling for the lagged value of percent overweight will absorb the effects of any past 
changes in how the school conducts business.  In such a case, we would expect the coefficient 
in column (6) to be zero. 
  Table 3 repeats the specifications in Table 2, with the obesity rate as the dependent 
variable and schools classified as marginal by their lowest performing subgroup. The results 
are quite similar, but smaller in magnitude. Overall, students in schools where the minimum 
scoring subgroup was within 5 points of the proficiency threshold in the prior year are 0.6 
percentage points more likely to be obese (see column 1). When the lagged obesity rate is 
controlled (column 2), the coefficient falls by about half but remains statistically significant. 
When we compare marginal schools to the top and bottom of the distribution separately in 
columns (3) and (4), marginal schools are only statistically significantly more likely to have 
obese students when compared to the higher performing schools, however, both point 
estimates are positive.  Again, the point estimates indicates that “marginal” schools have 
more obese students than schools that are either farther below or farther above the NCLB 
threshold.   Turning to our alternate specification, schools with larger annual test score gains 
see higher obesity rates, but the results are not robust to controlling for lagged obesity rates 
(columns 5 and 6). In the remaining tables and figures, we limit the analysis to the school’s 
rate of overweight, though results for obesity are qualitatively similar.22 
  Table 4 presents some robustness checks. Columns (1) – (3) change the independent 
variable of interest to whether any subgroup – not just the minimum-scoring subgroup – falls 
within 5 points of the passing threshold.23 The idea here is that even if a school has no real 
chance to meet AYP for its worst subgroup, if there is a marginal group at the school, policy 
changes may take place to get that group over the AYP threshold. The results are fairly similar 
                                            
22 Results for Table 4 and Figure 1 with obesity rate as the dependent variable are available upon request. 
23 This definition results in a much larger number of school-year-cells being defined as marginal – about 47 
percent.   18
to those in Table 2, but slightly smaller in magnitude once the prior rate of overweight is 
controlled. Columns (4) – (6) define the independent variable of interest as whether any 
subgroup has been marginal in any prior year.24 The intuition behind this final approach is 
that schools may have implemented policies to improve performance after a year in which 
they were marginal, and have continued to implement those policies in future years when 
they were no longer on the margin. When this specification is employed, the results are still 
similar but with slightly larger point estimates than those found in Table 2. 
  Overall, then, Tables 2 through 4 suggest that accountability pressures may have 
unintended side effects on children’s health. In particular, the coefficients are robust to 
controlling for the prior year’s rate of overweight, indicating that schools that are marginal on 
test scores see a discrete increase in overweight. We further build the case that this likely 
reflects a causal relationship by next turning to an event study analysis to investigate the time 
pattern of increases in the rate of overweight. We then report results of a survey we conducted 
that asked Arkansas school principals to about their policies and practices, and how those 
have changed after the implementation of NCLB.  
 
B. Event Study 
  The timing of increases in the rate of overweight can be estimated more directly using 
an event study analysis. Specifically, we fit the following equation: 
 (2) 
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where τst denotes the event-year, defined so that τ=0 in the first year that a school’s minimum 
subgroup scores within 5 points of the passing threshold (i.e. the first year a school is 
“marginal.”) τ=1 denotes the first year after a school is declared to be marginal, and so on. In 
                                            
24 This definition results in just over 72 percent of the school-year-cells being defined as marginal, a large 
increase that is not surprising.   19
the years in which τ<0, the school was not yet marginal. The coefficients are measured 
relative to the omitted coefficient τ≤-3. Schools that never have marginal status are still in the 
dataset, but they only help identify the relationship between covariates and overweight since 
the vector of τ’s are all zero for such schools. We include all available observations, even 
though we do not observe the full range of event-time for all schools. 
  Figure 1 plots the event-year coefficients from estimating equation (2). Although the 
coefficients are imprecisely estimated, the figure shows relatively flat trends in the years prior 
to first being marginal under NCLB, then a moderate jump in the following year. There is 
some additional upward movement in subsequent years which may reflect the intensifying of 
efforts to improve test scores that have negative spillover effects on students’ weight. Overall 
this provides further evidence that the timing lines up well with the hypothesis that 
accountability pressures under NCLB may be causing the increases in the rate of overweight. 
 
C. The Effect of NCLB on School Policies 
  At the start of this paper, we presented several theories on why accountability 
pressures might have an effect on students’ obesity: there may be changes in the school that 
unintentionally affect either students’ expenditures of energy (like a shift away from recess 
toward test preparation) or in-take of energy (like sales of junk food to raise extra money for 
test preparation) . In order to evaluate the validity of these theories, we fielded a survey to the 
principals of the Arkansas schools used in our study. Principals were invited via email to 
participate in an online survey, were offered a $10 incentive for participation in the form of a 
gift certificate to an online bookstore, and were reminded via email three times after the 
original request. Approximately 5 percent of the sample either did not have a valid email or 
had previously opted out of receiving survey invitations. Of the remainder, approximately 
20 percent responded to the survey, resulting in a dataset of 191 schools; however, not every   20
principal answered every question.  We matched the survey responses with our data set on 
test scores, demographics, and obesity rates to examine how schools that responded to the 
survey compare to other schools in Arkansas.  It is clear that the survey data set is not a 
random sample of Arkansas schools: respondents are principals at relatively better-off 
schools as measured by demographic characteristics, test scores, and the likelihood that they 
are passing under NCLB (see Appendix Table 2 for descriptive statistics). Nonetheless, the 
responses are informative about the types of changes that schools implemented in response to 
NCLB.  
  Table 5 presents results from the survey. First, we see that 86 percent of schools report 
increasing spending since NCLB went into effect. Ten percent report raising funds through 
sales of foods or beverages, and 17 percent report increased funding from vending machines 
or pouring rights contracts. At the same time, 38 percent report using food as a reward for 
students, either in the form of parties in school or coupons that can be redeemed for food 
items outside of school. Thus, we see some evidence that school changes in response to NCLB 
may be increasing calories consumed.  
  There is also evidence that changes in response to NCLB may be reducing time spent in 
physical activity. Schools report having increased instructional time on tested subjects 
(English/language arts and math) by almost an hour and a half per week. To make room for 
this additional instruction, 38 percent of schools report that time spent on non-academics has 
been reduced. Schools in the sample currently spend an average of almost 190 minutes (or 
about 3.2 hours) per week in PE classes and about 127 minutes (or about 2.1 hours) at recess. 
Taking both activities combined for all schools, students spend an average of 304 minutes (or 
about 5.1 hours) per week in PE and recess. This is substantially higher than the 150 minutes   21
per week of “physical activity” required by the state.25 Since NCLB, only 3 percent report 
reducing time spent in PE, while 12 percent report reducing time spent at recess.26 While only 
a small fraction of schools report decreasing the amount of time spent in physical activities, 
over 80 percent have not had increases since NCLB. In addition, a substantial fraction of 
schools report offering before or after school sessions for instruction, or increasing the length 
of the school day. To the extent that these sessions may be displacing active play or other 
physical activity, this may also contribute to weight gain among students. Finally, the 
overwhelming majority of schools report engaging in some explicit test preparation. Many 
(over 25 percent) report having test prep sessions after school, and 5 percent report 
conducting test preparation during recess, lunch or PE class. 
  Thus, there is evidence that NCLB may have reduced the opportunities for physical 
activity in Arkansas schools, although the changes do not seem overwhelming. That said, for 
the 22 schools for which we can calculate the drop in recess time, it averages 51 minutes per 
week.27 A simulation of a weekly reduction of that magnitude over the course of a 36 week 
school year implies that the rate of overweight of a population would increase by about 
1.6 percentage points.28 Interestingly, an increase of about 0.5 percentage points, as is found 
in Tables 2 and 3, is simulated to be achieved with less than a 20 minutes reduction in 
physical activity per week. 
  While this snapshot of the state of Arkansas school policies is quite interesting, we 
would ideally like to know whether the policies differ by our definitions of a “marginal” 
                                            
25 For K-8 students, at least 60 minutes of weekly physical activity must be in PE class. The remainder can 
include recess and after- or before-school activities. See http://arkansased.org/programs/csh/physed_faqs.html 
for more details. 
26 Note that not all schools answered both of these questions. In particular, only elementary schools tend to have 
recess, so while 186 schools reported time spent in PE, only 129 reported time spent at recess. 
27 The decrease in PE time among those reporting a decrease is 33 minutes per week. 
28 The simulation uses children age 6-16 from the NHANES who have an overweight rate of 36.4 percent. Using 
age-gender-weight-specific formulas for base metabolic rate (BMR), and assuming the children are in caloric 
balance before the change in weekly activity, it is possible to simulate the caloric imbalance and subsequent 
weight gain.   22
school. To this end, we are hampered by our small sample sizes, as well as differential 
response rates across groups and some issues of timing. The remaining columns of Table 5 
break out the responses by the school’s most recent (2007) test performance relative to the 
passing threshold. Although policy changes that might contribute to obesity have been 
implemented in schools across the board, there is some suggestive evidence that the food and 
exercise environments have changed more at lower-performing schools. 
  Perhaps the most reasonable approach would be to regress a policy such as reduction 
in PE or recess on the marginal definition based on any group being close to the AYP 
threshold at any time in the past (along with the basic demographic and school controls).29 
The drawbacks to this approach are twofold. First, for many of the policy variables, the 
samples are really quite small, potentially limiting our ability to find significance for 
coefficients that correspond to large effects. Second, a given school may have had a group 
scoring within 5 points of the AYP goal after 2007, meaning they really should be coded as 
being marginal in terms of the 2009 survey data. This measurement error would lead to 
attenuation bias in our estimates.  
  With these caveats in mind, it is worth noting that the coefficient on being marginal 
under NCLB on combined minutes of recess and PE is -29, but the estimate is not 
significantly different from zero. This point estimate is, however, quite in line with the type of 
change that was simulated to produce the estimated change in the rate of overweight.30 No 
other models have estimates that are significant at conventional levels.  
 
                                            
29 Note that controlling for the lagged rate of overweight does not really make sense in this context, since the 
inclusion of the lagged dependent variable in Tables 2 and 3 was meant to control for unobserved determinants 
of current overweight. 
30 A drop in activity of 30 minutes per week is simulated to increase the rate of overweight by 0.86 percentage 
points, which is close to the estimate in column (1) of Table 2. Note though that an activity drop of 76 minutes 
per week would imply just over a 2 percentage point increase in overweight, which is in line with column (4) of 
Table 3.   23
V. Conclusions and Further Avenues for Research  
  Through the No Child Left Behind Act, schools face increasing pressure to improve 
performance on standardized tests. Past research has clearly documented that school 
behaviors are affected by accountability pressures (e.g. Cullen and Reback 2006, Figlio 2006, 
Jacob 2005, Neal and Schanzenbach 2009, Rouse et al. 2007). Since schools are graded based 
primarily on standardized test scores, but not on other student outcomes such as children’s 
health, schools facing accountability pressure may well make decisions designed to increase 
test scores that have unintended negative consequences for children’s weight. 
  This paper adds to the small amount of evidence on the effect of accountability on the 
food and physical activity environment (e.g. Figlio and Winicki 2005, Yin 2009, Anderson 
and Butcher 2006b). By focusing on schools in Arkansas that are close to meeting AYP 
standards, we find schools that were on the margin of passing have about a 0.5 percentage 
point higher rate of overweight in the following year. This effect is based on models that also 
control for the school’s lagged rate of overweight. Models without the lagged dependent 
variable find larger effects. Because it is clear that schools with lower test scores also have 
students with worse socioeconomic outcomes it is important that we are not just comparing 
poor performing schools to better performing schools. Rather, being a “marginal” school has 
a positive point estimate for rates of obesity and overweight whether  the marginal schools are 
compared to those scoring farther above or farther below the AYP threshold.  
  These results present prima facie evidence that the NCLB accountability rules may 
have unintended adverse consequences for student health. As a result, parents and school 
administrators, and policy-makers should keep in mind the potential for impacts on 
children’s health as they consider how to reallocate school resources in pursuit of test score 
gains. 
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Appendix A: Determining Adequate Yearly Progress in Arkansas 
 
  During the time period studied, high-stakes math and literacy tests were given in 
grades 4, 6 and 8, and in algebra, geometry and 11th grade literacy. The publicly available 
school report card data report the percentage of students with scores on each test in various 
ranges (below basic, basic, proficient and advanced), separately for math and literacy. For 
each school, this information is reported not only for the “combined population,” but also for 
a variety of subgroups defined by race/ethnicity (African-American, Caucasian, Hispanic) and 
special classification status (economically disadvantaged, limited English proficiency, 
students with disabilities).31  
  Average proficiency rates are reported in the public-use data for all group-by-test cells 
with a sample size of at least 10. However, the cell does not count toward proficiency unless 
there are at least 40 students in the cell (for schools with fewer than 800 students) or the cell 
represents at least 5 percent of enrollment (for schools with 800 or more students). Since 
sample sizes are not included in the report card data, we merge on information from the 
Common Core of Data (CCD). The CCD reports for each grade and each year the total number 
of students, as well as the number of African-American, Caucasian and Hispanic students in 
the grade. We use these data to code whether a subgroup is large enough to count toward 
AYP. The CCD only reports the total number of economically disadvantaged students in the 
school (as measured by the fraction on free or reduced-price lunch). To estimate the grade-
specific population, then, we multiply the school-level fraction that is disadvantaged by the 
grade-specific enrollment. No information is available from either source for the number of 
students with disabilities or limited English proficiency. After trying several approaches to 
proxy for whether the sample sizes in these two groups would have been large enough to 
                                            
31 The report cards also list separate proficiency rates by gender, and for migrants, but these subgroups do not 
count toward AYP.   28
count toward AYP, we dropped both of these subgroups from the analysis. Note that in the 
end this improved our predictive power when we modeled the official AYP status as coded by 
the state as a function of the program rules and the public-use data. 
  If fewer than 95 percent of students are tested in math and reading, the school 
automatically fails AYP. The report card lists whether the school meets the 95 percent 
threshold, and if not it reports the school-wide percentage of students tested. The 
denominator of this calculation is all students enrolled in the grade or course at the time of 
testing.  
  If the proficiency rate in the cell is greater than or equal to that year’s passing target 
(termed “Annual Measurable Objective” or AMO and displayed in Appendix Table 1), and at 
least 95 percent of the eligible students are tested, then that group-by-test meets AYP. The 
school as a whole meets AYP if both its combined population and all subgroups that count 
toward proficiency meet the AYP requirements. If any subgroup fails to meet that year’s AMO 
(and does not meet AYP through the safe harbor provision described below), then the school 
has failed to meet AYP. As a result, the binding constraint is the proficiency rate of the worst-
performing subgroup that is large enough to count toward the rating. Our empirical approach 
reflects this by defining each school by the performance of its subgroup with the lowest 
passing rate. 
  A school can have its AYP status determined based either on the current year’s 
performance or the average over the prior 3 years. The metric chosen can vary across years, 
but must be consistent across all subgroups within the same year. Our empirical work defines 
being marginal under AYP based only on the current year’s results. Robustness checks that 
use the maximum of the current year and the 3-year average are substantially the same. 
  Schools can also be classified as meeting AYP requirements even if the passing rate is 
below the year’s AMO under the safe harbor provision, as long as at least 95 percent of   29
students are tested in the year. Under safe harbor, if the fraction of students scoring below 
proficient in each subgroup declines by at least 10 percent from the prior year, then the school 
meets AYP requirements for that year. In addition, the school meets AYP under safe harbor if 
its observed increase in proficiency rates falls within a 95 percent confidence interval of the 
safe harbor goal. Over this time period, the minimum increase necessary to meet AYP under 
safe harbor was always greater than 5 points, which is the cutoff for being a “marginal” school 
in the analysis. 
  In order to meet AYP, schools must also satisfy the appropriate “secondary indicator.” 
For high schools, graduation rate must be at least 70 percent, and for non-high schools 
attendance rates must be at least 91.13 percent. Among schools that are passing due to test 
rates, relatively few fail due to the secondary indicator. We do not use this information in our 
analysis.    30
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(w/in 5 pts of AYP) 
Non-marginal 
Schools 
Marginal   0.183  1  0 
 (0.387)  --  -- 
Below AYP   0.405  0  0.496 
 (0.491)  --  (.500) 
Above AYP   0.412  0  .504 
 (0.492)  --  (.500) 
Overweight Rate  38.3  39.0  38.1 
    (5.8)  (5.2)  (6.0) 
Obesity Rate  21.1  21.6  20.9 
 (4.7)  (4.4)  (4.8) 
Percent Free/Reduced-  53.6  52.5  53.8 
    Price Lunch  (18.9)  (16.4)  (19.4) 
Percent Nonwhite  26.9  20.8  28.2 
 (28.3)  (24.7)  (28.9) 
English Proficiency  13.5  15.0  13.2 
    Rate  (16.8)  (15.3)  (17.1) 
Math Proficiency  12.6  13.1  12.5 
    Rate  (18.8)  (15.2)  (19.5) 
Annual Gain  -0.992  3.0  -1.88 
 (27.3)  (25.3)  (27.6) 
Observations 2852  523  2329 
 
Notes: Means (std. deviations) are shown. “Marginal” is defined as the lowest scoring 
subgroup in the school being within 5 points of the AYP goal in the prior year, while “Below 
AYP” and “Above AYP” are defined as that subgroup being more than 5 points below or above 
the AYP goal in the prior year, respectively. Overweight (obesity) rate is based on students 
being above the 85th (95th) percentile of the age and gender-specific BMI distribution set by 
the Centers for Disease Control. “Annual Gain” is defined as the overall school combined 
increase in English and math proficiency rates over the prior year. Observations are at the 
school-year level.   32
Table 2: 
Effect of Accountability Pressures on the Overweight Status of Students 
 
 
    (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)    (6) 
Marginal minimum 
subgroup 
0.934*** 0.485**  0.591**  0.361     
(0.27) (0.21) (0.23) (0.23)    
Minimum subgroup 
>5 points below AYP  
  0 . 2 3 0      
  ( 0 . 2 1 )      
Minimum subgroup 
>5 points above AYP  
   - 0 . 2 3 0     
   ( 0 . 2 1 )     
Annual  Gain      0.029***  0.00009 
      (0.0036)  (0.0032) 
Lag Overweight Rate     0.708*** 0.705*** 0.705***   0.709*** 
    (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)   (0.017) 
Constant 34.68  -585.2***  -598.8***  -598.5***  15.87 -564.5*** 
  (150) (194) (195) (195) (151) (194) 
Observations  2852 2090 2090 2090 2869 2078 
R-squared  0.28 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.29 0.65 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1            
 
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for within school correlation. The 
dependent variable is the school-wide rate of overweight, where overweight is defined as 
being above the 85th percentile of the age and gender-specific BMI distribution set by the 
Centers for Disease Control. All models include a time trend and four powers of the overall 
English proficiency rate relative to AYP, four powers of the overall math proficiency rate 
relative to AYP, four powers of the percent of students who are nonwhite, and four powers of 
the percent of students who are poor. “Marginal” is defined as the lowest scoring subgroup in 
the school being within 5 points of the AYP goal in the prior year, while “Below AYP” and 
“Above AYP” are defined as that subgroup being more than 5 points below or above the AYP 
goal in the prior year, respectively. “Annual Gain” is defined as the overall school combined 
increase in English and math proficiency rates over the prior year.    33
Table 3: 
Effect of Accountability Pressures on the Obesity Status of Students 
        
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Marginal minimum 
subgroup 
0.637*** 0.281*  0.441**  0.094     
(0.198) (0.160) (0.180) (0.180)     
        
Minimum subgroup >5 
points below AYP 
   0.347**     
   (0.166)     
        
Minimum subgroup >5 
points above AYP 
    -0.347**    
    (0.166)    
        
Annual Gain          0.026***  0.003 
         (0.003)  (0.002) 
            
Lag Obesity Rate    0.709***  0.703***  0.703***   0.709*** 
   (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016)    (0.016) 







482.3***  87.83 
-
472.9*** 
 (119)  (146)  (146)  (146)  (121)  (145) 
Observations 2,849  2,087  2,087  2,087  2,866  2,075 
R-squared 0.325 0.668 0.669 0.669 0.342 0.671 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1           
        
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for within school correlation. The 
dependent variable is the school-wide rate of obesity, where obesity is defined as being above 
the 95th percentile of the age and gender-specific BMI distribution set by the Centers for 
Disease Control. All models include a time trend and four powers of the overall English 
proficiency rate relative to AYP, four powers of the overall math proficiency rate relative to 
AYP, four powers of the percent of students who are nonwhite, and four powers of the percent 
of students who are poor. “Marginal” is defined as the lowest scoring subgroup in the school 
being within 5 points of the AYP goal in the prior year, while “Below AYP” and “Above AYP” 
are defined as that subgroup being more than 5 points below or above the AYP goal in the 
prior year, respectively. “Annual Gain” is defined as the overall school combined increase in 
English and math proficiency rates over the prior year.   34
Table 4: 
Robustness Checks for the  
Effect of Accountability Pressures on the Overweight Status of Students 
          
   (1)  (2)  (3)     (4) (5) (6) 
  Any subgroup within 5 points 
last year     Any subgroup within 5 points in 
any previous year 
Marginal   1.463***  0.382**  0.428**    2.605***  0.571***  0.703*** 
 (0.22)  (0.17)  (0.20)    (0.32)  (0.19)  (0.20) 
Below  AYP       0.164       0.628 
     (0.28)       (0.44) 
Lag Overweight Rate    0.705***  0.704***      0.699***  0.697*** 
   (0.02)  (0.02)     (0.02)  (0.02) 
Constant -1.429  -
594.9*** 
-
599.4***   459.1*** -460.9** -445.2** 
   (151)  (195)  (195)     (156) (198) (198) 
Observations  2852 2090 2090    2852 2090 2090 
R-squared 0.29  0.65  0.65      0.31 0.65 0.65 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1         
 
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for within school correlation. The 
dependent variable is the school-wide rate of overweight, where overweight is defined as 
being above the 85th percentile of the age and gender-specific BMI distribution set by the 
Centers for Disease Control. All models include a time trend and four powers of the overall 
English proficiency rate relative to AYP, four powers of the overall math proficiency rate 
relative to AYP, four powers of the percent of students who are nonwhite, and four powers of 
the percent of students who are poor. In columns (1) – (3) “Marginal” is defined as any 
subgroup in the school being within 5 points of the AYP goal in the prior year, while “Below 
AYP” is defined as any subgroup being more than 5 points below the AYP goal (provided no 
subgroup was within 5 points) in the prior year. In columns (4) – (6) “Marginal” is defined as 
any subgroup in the school being within 5 points of the AYP goal in any of the prior years, 
while “Below AYP” is defined as any subgroup being more than 5 points below the AYP goal 
(provided no subgroup was within 5 points) in any of the prior years. 
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Table 5: 
Results from a Survey of School Principals 
        
   (1) (2) (3) (4) 











% total responses  1.000 0.217 0.111 0.672 
        
Spending has increased =1  0.864  0.897  0.895  0.847 
If increased spending, from what source? (Check all that apply)   
Food fund raisers  0.105  0.114  0.059  0.110 
Vending machines/pouring rights  0.171  0.343  0.118  0.120 
        
Any extrinsic rewards for student 
success on test? 1=yes  0.619 0.732 0.667 0.575 
If extrinsic rewards, what types? (Check all that apply)    
Food  0.376 0.400 0.429 0.356 
        
Weekly minutes spent on subjects:         
ELA 589.4  575.4  451.2  616.9 
Math 400.4  375.2  369.0  413.8 
Lunch 191.2  192.2  197.6  189.8 
PE 188.9  208.6  237.9  174.4 
Recess 126.5  70.1  79.3  151.9 
PE + Recess  303.7  265.1  317.1  314.0 
        
Change in min/week since NCLB:         
ELA 51.7  62.8  55.6  47.0 
Math 35.0  39.5  52.5  30.1 
Lunch  -0.9 -0.3 -4.2 -0.5 
PE 13.5  11.9  11.7  14.4 
Recess -6.5  -5.5  3.0  -8.3 
PE + Recess  5.8  6.3  12.1  4.6 
        
Where did extra instructional time come from? (Check all that apply)   
Before/after school sessions 
(optional or required) 
0.450 0.585 0.429 0.409 
Reduced time on non-academic 
activities 
0.381 0.390 0.333 0.386 
Increased length of school day  0.111 0.171  0.095  0.094 
Increased length of school year  0.026 0.024 0.048 0.024 
        
School does some test prep =1  0.887  0.950  0.905  0.864   36
When does test prep occur? (Check all that apply)    
After school  0.255  0.474  0.158  0.194 
During other non-academic classes  0.121  0.105  0.263  0.102 
During recess, lunch or PE  0.055  0.053  0.053  0.056 
Before school  0.055  0.079  0.053  0.046 
 
Notes: Not all questions were answered by each of the 191 schools.   37
Appendix Table 1: Proficiency Rate Goals in Arkansas, by Grade Span and Year 
 
 Grades  K-5    Grades 6-8    Grades 9-12 
 Literacy  Math    Literacy Math    Literacy Math 
2002 31.80  28.20    18.10  15.30    19.50 10.40 
2003 37.48  34.18    24.93  22.36    26.21 17.87 
2004 43.16  40.16    31.76  29.42    32.92 25.34 
2005 48.84  46.14    38.59  36.48    39.53 32.81 
2006 amendment changed schedule        
2006 42.40  40.00    35.20  29.10    35.50 29.20 
2007 49.60  47.50    43.30  38.06    43.56 38.05 
2008 56.80  55.00    51.40  47.02    51.62 46.90 
2009 64.00  62.50    59.50  55.98    59.68 55.75 
2010 71.20  70.00    67.60  64.55    67.75 64.60 
2011 78.40  77.50    75.70  73.41    75.81 73.45 
2012 85.60  85.00    83.80  82.28    83.88 82.30 
2013 92.80  92.50    91.90  91.14    91.94 91.15 
2014 100  100    100  100    100 100   38
Appendix Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Survey Sample vs. Overall Sample 
 





Demographics       
 Percent  non-white  0.264   0.181 0.280 
 Percent  Free/RP  lunch  0.558   0.504 0.570 
 Majority  Non-white=1  0.198   0.087 0.221 
  Majority poor = 1  0.602    0.516 0.620 
  School eligible for Title I funds  0.749    0.721 0.755 
  Receiving Schoolwide title I  0.833    0.782 0.843 
         
Total enrollment  409.0    451.2 400.4 
         
Geography       
 City=1  0.191    0.206 0.188 
 Town=1  0.192    0.152 0.201 
 Suburb=1  0.079   0.109 0.073 
 Rural=1  0.537   0.533 0.538 
         
% Overweight or At-Risk  0.382    0.368 0.385 
         
Test performance        
  Overall ELA standard score  10.1    14.4 9.1 
  Overall Math standard score  14.3    20.8 12.9 
  Min sub-group ELA score  3.6    6.8 2.9 
  Min sub-group math score  8.1    13.8 6.9 
  Min group is close (w/in 5 points)  0.184    0.142 0.193 
  Fail: Min group more than 5 points away  0.391    0.277 0.416 
  Pass: Min group more than 5 points away  0.425    0.581 0.391 
 